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ABSTRACT 
Eminent Domain:  The Unintended Consequences of Kelo 
by 
Tracy Lynn Bower 
Dr. David Fott, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
In recent years, local governments in the United States have increasingly 
used eminent domain to promote economic development, raising concerns 
among property-right advocates over what those advocates view as unlawful, or 
what should be unlawful, takings of private property in order to benefit another 
private property owner. This philosophical and legal dispute reached a crisis 
point in the 2005 United States Supreme Court decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London.  In that decision, the court narrowly upheld a Connecticut Supreme 
Court ruling granting the City of New London permission to redevelop land that 
had been seized from existing homeowners and transferred to another private 
party for economic development.  The decision sparked an immediate public 
outcry and prompted forty-three states to consider some type of reform to protect 
property owners from similar actions by government.  
This thesis examines the legal, policy, and ethical implications that the Kelo 
case has had in the United States and in Nevada.  It reviews the principal 
academic literature and case law concerning eminent domain in the United 
States, up to and including the Kelo decision, then specifically focuses on 
 iv
assessing the legal and policy responses of Nevada and other states to Kelo.  It 
notes that while the post-Kelo reforms of some states have been highly effective, 
others have done little to safeguard property owners against Kelo-type takings.  It 
briefly reviews the policy influence of Dewey and Locke in current approaches to 
eminent domain, and concludes that Nevada’s post-Kelo approach is an effective 
model for limiting how eminent domain is used, while still achieving the 
obligations government has to protect its people.
 v
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Kelo Decision 
 
 
In Kelo v. City of New London1, the United States Supreme Court issued a 
ruling that has sent state legislators and voters running to protect property 
owners from what many see as unlawful, or what should be unlawful, takings of 
private property in order to benefit another private property owner.  The case 
stemmed from attempts by the City of New London, Connecticut to redevelop 
land.  The city, through a city-formed development corporation, sought to 
redevelop a waterfront area in order to revitalize the community and the 
economy.2  The plan included taking homes from private property owners in 
order to develop a new waterfront park with a state park, new homes, small 
businesses such as restaurants and shows, and office space.  A property 
adjacent to the site would house a new research facility that Pfizer Corporation 
committed to build.3  Property owners, including Susette Kelo, argued in part that 
the City of New London was taking private property for a non-public use and 
sought to stop the taking by arguing that the non-public use was a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment.  In a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
                                                 
1
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
2
 Ibid., 473. 
3
 Ibid.  
 2
Connecticut Supreme Court’s ruling granting the City of New London permission 
to redevelop the land.4   
At its simplest, the court ruled that states could decide under what 
circumstances eminent domain could be used to take private property, even if 
states wanted to turn that property over to another private property owner for the 
purposes of economic development.5  The case once again raised the question 
of whether there is a difference between a public purpose and a public use.  That 
distinction is hotly debated even though the Kelo case effectively said that there 
was not a distinction and that legislatures, not the judiciary, can decide under 
what circumstances eminent domain may be used. 
The case has prompted forty-three states to consider anti-Kelo action in one 
form or another.6  Some of these reforms have been highly effective while others 
profess to protect property owners but do little to really safeguard against Kelo-
type takings.7  This thesis examines the Kelo case and the legal, policy, and 
ethical implications that the case has in the United States, and more specifically 
here in Nevada.   
The second chapter of this thesis will focus on the history of eminent domain 
and the legal cases that set precedent for the Kelo case.  That history dates back 
to the seventeenth century in Europe and includes a long history in the United 
States as well.   During colonial times, eminent domain was used for constructing 
                                                 
4
 Ibid., 469. 
5
 Ibid., 469-470. 
6
 Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card - Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since 
Kelo [report on-line] (Arlington, Virginia: Castle Coalition, 2007-2008, accessed 23 October 2009); 
available from http://www.castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view 
&id=57&Itemid=113; Internet.   
7
 Ibid., 2. 
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mills.8  The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution addresses eminent domain, 
though not as clearly as some would like.  It states “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”9  Though the amendment 
addressed eminent domain specifically, it was not until the Fourteenth 
Amendment was passed that states had to afford the same protections as the 
federal government in terms of compensation.10  The chapter will also review the 
history of eminent domain in the United States through relevant case law in the 
twentieth century, specifically the three cases that are most commonly linked with 
the Kelo case:  Berman v. Parker (1954), Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 
(1984), and what may be the most closely related situation, the case of Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit (1981)11.  In that case, the Michigan 
Supreme Court affirmed the city’s right to use eminent domain for economic 
redevelopment because the state legislature had deemed that the type of plan 
described in the case “meets a public need and serves an essential public 
purpose.  The Court’s role after such determination is made is limited.”12  Though 
the Poletown case never went to the United States Supreme Court, the rationale 
                                                 
8
 Charles Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London:  An Argument for Banning 
Economic Development Takings,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 29 (2006):  501. 
9
 U.S. Constitution, amend. 5. 
10
 Gregg Ivers, “Eminent Domain”, in Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States 
(2008), 103-104.   
11
 “Alas, the land, which looked infinite to the early pioneers, was, in the end, finite.  And the 
galvanizing cases eventually came in the form of Berman v. Parker, Hawaii v. Midkiff, and 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit….” (Carla T. Main, “How Eminent Domain Ran Amok,” 
Policy Review 133, October-November 2005 [journal on-line]; available from http:// 
www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/2920831.html; Internet; accessed 23 October 2009).  
See also Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo,” 494:  “The famous modern U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in the area, Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, adopted a 
rational basis standard of review…. Usually included in the trio of public use cases granting 
extreme deference to the governmental taker is the Michigan Supreme Court’s recently 
overturned decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit….”   
12
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (1981), 
633. 
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and decisions in both cases are very similar and point to the expansive power of 
the legislature to take private property for something other than a traditional 
public use.   
The third chapter of this thesis will focus on the reaction to the Kelo decision.  
Kelo has been the impetus for numerous state legislative actions and ballot 
initiatives designed to protect private property rights.  Most states have 
considered some type of legislative action in reaction to the case, but the nature 
of the reforms has varied widely with some states restricting eminent domain 
uses to true public uses, while others approved reforms that did little to protect 
private property.13  This chapter will review what scholars Ilya Somin and Andrew 
P. Morris and the Castle Coalition, a self-described property rights advocacy 
group, view as effective and ineffective reforms, and will present examples of 
both types of reform efforts from various states.  Chapter three will also provide 
an in-depth review of Nevada’s reaction to the Kelo case.  Nevada’s efforts 
included a ballot initiative called PISTOL (the People’s Initiative to Stop the 
Taking of Our Land) that eventually became a constitutional amendment, as well 
as legislative actions that sought to provide a compromise to some of the more 
stringent aspects to the ballot initiative. 
The final chapter will provide an overview of the reform efforts that I advocate 
to balance the needs of government to provide for legitimate public services with 
property rights protections for Americans.  This includes limiting eminent domain 
to public uses and prohibiting its use for public purposes.  The chapter will also 
briefly review property rights through the writings of John Dewey and John 
                                                 
13
 Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card. 
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Locke, two scholars with differing views of the individual and his or her 
relationship to government.  
 6
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
HISTORY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Kelo v. City of New London (2005) is one in a long list of eminent domain 
cases that have captured the attention of the courts and the public.  
Understanding the Kelo decision requires an understanding of the history of 
eminent domain and previous case law that led to the United States Supreme 
Court decision in 2005.  References to the state or an agent of the state seizing 
property can be found as early as the seventeenth century and those early 
writings provided the framework for eminent domain’s use in the early United 
States.  This chapter briefly describes the history of eminent domain law from the 
seventeenth century to the present day, referencing the work of early scholars 
including Hugo Grotius and contemporary scholars including Charles Cohen, 
Errol Meidinger and Carla Main.  Taken as a whole, the views of these scholars 
underscore the dynamic relationship that exists between legal views of state 
power over private property and the socioeconomic realities that may exist in a 
particular community at any given time.  Particular reference is made to 
prominent American case law in the twentieth century, including discussions of 
the cases cited in the Kelo decision itself and the expanded use of eminent 
domain for economic development.  
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Early History 
 
The King’s Prerogative in Saltpetre case in the early 1600s provided the King 
of England with some ability to use what Hugo Grotius would later call “eminent 
domain.”14  In the case, the King was given authority to enter a property and to 
take a natural resource on the land if that resource was needed for the defense 
of the kingdom.  The case centered on the need for saltpeter, a mineral used in 
making gunpowder.  The King was given authority to remove the saltpeter from a 
property but with some restrictions attached.  Those restrictions limited the 
purpose for which the King could take the mineral, how often the King could enter 
private property for this purpose and how the mineral could be removed from the 
property. 
The first restriction required that the taking must be used for the protection of 
the kingdom.  Parliament found that “the taking of saltpetre is a purveyance of it 
for the making of gunpowder for the necessary defence and safety of the realm; 
and therefore is inseparably annexed to the Crown....”15  The fact that the mineral 
was found to be a factor in the defense of the kingdom meant that the King’s right 
to the mineral outweighed the property owner’s right.  The law prohibited using 
the mineral for any other purpose; the case states that the right to the mineral 
could not be “converted to any other use than for the defence of the realm, for 
which purpose only the law gave to the King this prerogative.”16  The second 
restriction urged restraint on the part of the King, saying that the King should not 
                                                 
14
  Hugo Grotius coined the term “eminent domain” in De Jure Belli Ac Pacis (On the Law of War 
and Peace) nearly fifty years after King’s Prerogative in Saltpetre.   
15
  The Case of the King’s Prerogative in Saltpetre, 77 English Report 1294 (1604). 
16
  Ibid. 
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repeatedly dig for the mineral on the same land.  The ruling said that the King or 
his agents “ought not to stay in one place, nor return before a long time is 
passed.”17  The third restriction limited how the mineral could be taken.  The 
ruling gave the King the right to have his agents dig for the mineral, but they were 
required not to destroy the property; in fact, they were “bound to leave the 
inheritance of the subject in so good plight as they found it….”18  The King’s 
agents could not damage a home or any other buildings on the property nor 
could they dig up the floor of a home or a barn, which could be difficult and take a 
long time to repair.  The King was limited in when this work could be performed, 
as well.  The ruling called for the King or his agent to work when the owner was 
present and between sunrise and sunset.19  Interestingly, the ruling made 
arguments as to why the time-of-day restrictions on work were important and the 
argument was not one of mere convenience.  Ending by sunset allowed the 
owner to secure the home for the night.  The ruling called the home: 
…the safest place for my refuge, safety and comfort, and of all my family; 
as well in sickness as in health, and it is my defence in the night and in the 
day, against felons, misdoers, and harmful animals; and it is very 
necessary for the weal public that the habitation of subjects be preserved 
and maintained. 20 
In other words, the home was as vital to the defense of the family as the saltpeter 
was to the defense of the kingdom.   
As already noted, the first use of the term “eminent domain” can be traced 
back to seventeenth-century scholar Hugo Grotius.  In On the Law of War and 
                                                 
17
  Ibid. 
18
  Ibid. 
19
  Ibid., 1296. 
20
  Ibid., 1294. 
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Peace, Grotius writes that private property, like other privileges, “can be taken… 
in two ways, either as a penalty, or by the force of eminent domain.”21  Eminent 
domain could be “exercised in its name by the one who holds supreme 
authority.”22  Though government holds the power of eminent domain, Grotius 
does place limitations on its use, saying that eminent domain may only be used 
for a “public advantage; then, that compensation from the public funds be made, 
if possible, to the one who has lost his right.”23  In Book Three of On the Law of 
War and Peace, Grotius outlines more specifically how and when eminent 
domain could be used, granting the authority to use eminent domain to an agent 
of the state: 
The state, or he who represents the state, can use the property of 
subjects, and even destroy it or alienate it, not only in case of direct need, 
which grants even to private citizens a measure of right over others’ 
property, but also for the sake of the public advantage; and to the public 
advantage those very persons who formed the body politic should be 
considered as desiring that private advantage should yield.24 
In other words, any greater good for the community as a whole is a justifiable 
reason for using eminent domain.   
 
Eminent Domain in Early America 
 
 
The uses described in the King’s Prerogative case and by Grotius are quite 
different from the forms that eminent domain took in early America.  Both Charles 
Cohen and Errol Meidinger provide comprehensive overviews of the use of 
                                                 
21
 Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book Three (De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libre Tres), 
ed. James Brown Scott, transl. Francis W. Kelsey (London: Clarendon Press, 1925), 385. 
22
 Ibid., 797. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid., 807. 
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eminent domain during this period, when creating successful economies meant 
putting land to good use quickly.  For example, Charles Cohen describes how 
eminent domain was used to provide access to public roads and to provide 
benefits to mill owners in order to encourage the construction of grist mills for the 
grinding of grains into flour and meals.25  In the matter of roadways, Errol 
Meidinger describes how landowners who found they did not have access to 
public roads could cut a path across a neighboring landowner’s property in order 
to gain access to the roadway – and how “New Jersey and Pennsylvania both 
reserved rights to take back for highway purposes six percent of all the lands 
they granted.” 26 
In reviewing this early history of eminent domain, Cohen writes that because 
colonial grist mills were typically powered by water, Mill Acts were passed allowing 
mill owners to dam streams and rivers, often resulting in the flooding of upstream 
properties with little relief to the owners of those properties.27  According to Cohen, 
in some communities where these acts were in place, a mill owner “was liable only 
for annual or permanent damages and enjoyed a privileged status compared with his 
common-law forebears, whose aggrieved upper riparian neighbors could resort to 
the remedies of self-help, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.”28  Cohen further 
writes that the mills were considered public utilities in many cases because the 
public had access to them; consequently, the “public use” term that is used so often 
today also applied to the mills (though Cohen adds that some instances of using the 
                                                 
25
 Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo,”  501. 
26
 Errol E. Meidinger, “The Public Uses of Eminent Domain: History and Policy,” Environmental 
Law 11 (1980-1981): 14. 
27
 Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo,” 501. 
28
 Ibid. 
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acts to benefit private mills are also recorded).29   Cohen states that in an effort to 
promote development, some colonies even allowed land to be turned over to 
someone else if an owner failed to mine when a discovery had been made, or if a 
landowner failed to build a mill on a parcel or make other uses on a piece of land.30   
By the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, eminent domain was considered 
part of common law.  The Bill of Rights did not grant authority for government to 
use eminent domain; rather it defined under what circumstances eminent domain 
could be used.  The Fifth Amendment states that “…nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”31  That statement accepts the 
inherent nature of eminent domain and outlines the limitations for its use.  The 
founders recognized that at times the government would need to take private 
property, even if the property owner was not a willing seller.  The Fifth 
Amendment simply required the government to compensate a property owner for 
the property taken.  As Meidinger writes: 
Eminent domain was not high among the concerns of those debating the 
Bill of Rights.  Indeed there is little evidence that it was a concern at all.  
Eminent domain was one prerogative the British had not been charged 
with abusing in the New World.32   
 
During this time, eminent domain was also used for what is today called 
traditional public uses, which include government functions such as the 
construction of government buildings.33 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., 501-502.   
30
 Ibid., 502.     
31
 U.S. Constitution, amend. 5. 
32
 Meidinger, “Public Uses,” 17. 
33
 Ibid., 18. 
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The Fifth Amendment did not guarantee protection in all eminent domain 
cases; the Supreme Court ruled that the Bill of Rights was not applicable to 
states.34  The court weighed in on that question in the case of Barron v. City of 
Baltimore (1833).35  The United States Supreme Court heard the case, which 
involved wharf owners in Baltimore whose property was damaged by the city’s 
actions when the city redirected several streams that flowed to the wharf.  In 
periods of heavy rain, the streams carried debris to the wharf, making it shallow 
and damaging the plaintiff’s property because “the water was rendered so 
shallow that it ceased to be useful for vessels.”36  Plaintiff John Barron sued over 
the loss of value of the wharf, arguing that the Fifth Amendment applied in the 
case and that the City of Baltimore was then liable for compensating the wharf 
owners for the damage to the property.  The court found that the Fifth 
Amendment applied to actions by the federal government, not to state or local 
governments.37  Writing for the court, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that “the 
Constitution was ordained and established by the people of the United States for 
themselves, for their own government, and not for the government of the 
individual states.”38  State governments were “framed by different persons and 
for different persons”; therefore, the permissions and limitations in the Bill of 
Rights do not apply to states.  Justice Marshall continued, “…amendments were 
proposed by the required majority in Congress, and adopted by the states.  
These amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them 
                                                 
34
 Ivers, “Eminent Domain,” 103-104.   
35
 Ibid., 104. 
36
 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
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to the state governments.”39  If state constitutions did not provide the protection 
of certain rights, they did not exist.   
That position held until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 
and a case involving railroads.40  At that time, Cohen notes that eminent domain 
was often used to amass the land needed to build rail lines and other 
infrastructure projects such as bridges.41  Rail lines were commonly constructed 
by private companies and land was often taken by eminent domain and turned 
over to railroad companies because they “were what would today be called 
common carriers, obligated to provide service to any member of the public.” 42  
Interestingly, the case that would test the Fourteenth Amendment involved a 
government taking of land that belonged to a railroad company.   
The Fourteenth Amendment states: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.43 
The case that tested that amendment involved a dispute with the Burlington & 
Quincy Railroad Company.44  In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company 
v. Chicago the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the Burlington and Quincy 
Railroad was not entitled to compensation when the City of Chicago placed a 
road across one of the company’s railroad tracks.45  The United States Supreme 
                                                 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ivers, “Eminent Domain,” 103-104. 
41
 Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo,” 506. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 U.S. Constitution, amend. 14, sec. 1. 
44
 Ivers, “Eminent Domain,” 103-104. 
45
 Ibid. 
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Court ruled that under the Fourteenth Amendment, the state must compensate 
the railroad for the taking.46 
 
The Path to Kelo 
 
 
Many early eminent domain cases were used to encourage productive use of 
the land and the associated resources. Carla Main writes that as land became 
scarce and as economies suffered, eminent domain was being used more often.  
New Deal economic policies were a part of the reason for the increased use of 
eminent domain because “before the New Deal, it hadn’t occurred to many local 
legislatures that they held the magic wand to revitalize their sagging waterfronts 
or depressed downtowns.”47  Meidinger describes an evolution of eminent 
domain that occurred as the American economy shifted.  “At every historical 
juncture the courts have had to decide whether to enforce takings with 
substantial new private development components.  Their decisions form an 
interesting chapter in American political-economic history.”48  
While dozens of cases are relevant to the Kelo decision, three cases are 
often seen as paving the road to the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in the case.  
The Supreme Court itself relied on Berman v. Parker (1954) and Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff (1984)49 in deciding the Kelo case while Carla Main and 
Charles Cohen both point to those cases and the case of Poletown 
Neighborhood Council v. Detroit (1981) to show that eminent domain was not as 
                                                 
46
 Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
47
 Main, “How Eminent Domain Ran Amok.” 
48
 Meidinger, “Public Uses,” 3. 
49
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), 469. 
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clear cut as the Fifth Amendment made it sound.50  In light of those 
recommendations, this section will look at those three cases, as well as a state 
case that overturned the Poletown case, Wayne County v. Hathcock (Mich. 
2004).   
In Berman v. Parker (1954), the United States Supreme Court considered a 
case that was similar to the Kelo case it would hear more than fifty years later.  
The high court affirmed a District Court ruling on eminent domain with a rationale 
that was similar to the Kelo ruling.  The court upheld the legislative branch’s 
authority to determine how eminent domain could be used.  In the Berman case, 
the owner of a private business was forced into an eminent domain battle with 
Congress.  Since Congress acts as the legislative branch for the District of 
Columbia, Congress approved the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 
1945.  In the Act, Congress determined that a portion of the District of Columbia 
was blighted and that the areas were “injurious to the public health, safety, 
morals, and welfare.”51  Congress created a redevelopment agency to eliminate 
“all such injurious conditions by employing all means necessary and appropriate 
for the purpose.”52  The redevelopment agency acted broadly to condemn homes 
and businesses in a section of Washington, D.C., that was particularly blighted.  
The Washington, D.C., Planning Commission created redevelopment plans for 
                                                 
50
 “Alas, the land, which looked infinite to the early pioneers, was, in the end, finite.  And the 
galvanizing cases eventually came in the form of Berman v. Parker, Hawaii v. Midkiff, and 
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit....” (Main, “How Eminent Domain Ran Amok.”)  See 
also Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo,” 494:  “The famous modern U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions in the area, Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, adopted a 
rational basis standard of review…. Usually included in the trio of public use cases granting 
extreme deference to the governmental taker is the Michigan Supreme Court’s recently 
overturned decision in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit….”    
51
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), 29. 
52
 Ibid.  
 16
the neighborhood.  The case cited surveys from the Planning Commission 
showing that in 1950, “64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4% needed 
major repairs, (and) only 17.3% were satisfactory….”53  The redevelopment plans 
included a blend of infrastructure improvements and public schools, and 
prescribed that at least one-third of the new housing units would be low-rent.  
The redevelopment agency assembled the land that was to be redeveloped, and 
at that point the agency transferred the portions that were to be used for public 
infrastructure such as roads and public uses such as schools.  The remaining 
land was available to be sold or leased for redevelopment, with preference “to be 
given to private enterprise over public agencies in executing the redevelopment 
plan.”54  
The case was brought by property owners within the redevelopment area. 
They owned a department store and argued that their property was a commercial 
parcel, was not blighted, and therefore should not be taken and turned over to 
another private landowner for redevelopment.55  They argued that the taking of a 
property that was not blighted violated the Fifth Amendment because the land 
was being taken with the intent of selling it to another private landowner.  In 
essence, they were guilty by association.  They were being forced out of their 
property not because it was blighted itself, but merely because it was in a 
blighted area.   
Justice William Douglas wrote the Court’s opinion, which recognized the 
authority of Congress to act as the legislative branch for the District of Columbia 
                                                 
53
 Ibid., 31. 
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Ibid., 32. 
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and as such to develop standards for using eminent domain.  He noted that, 
“subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the 
public interest has been declared in terms well nigh conclusive.”56  Congress, 
acting as the legislative branch for Washington, D.C., has the responsibility for 
determining what a public purpose may be and “the means of executing the 
project are for Congress, and Congress alone, to determine once the public 
purpose has been established.”57  The Court further stated that as long as the 
property owner is compensated for the taking, his or her rights have been upheld.  
The Court acknowledged the murkiness of the extent of the legislative branch, 
likening it to the sometimes undefined nature of police power: 
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order – 
these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional 
application of the police power to municipal affairs.  Yet they merely 
illustrate the scope of the power, and do not delimit it.58  
 
As Cohen noted, “that private enterprise would be used in redeveloping the area 
did not mean the public use requirement was violated.”59  In other words, if the 
intent of the project was a public use or benefit, the method by which that intent 
was carried out was not an issue.  
     This slippery slope continued with other landmark eminent domain cases in 
the twentieth century.  Main writes that “it seemed only a matter of time until the 
criteria for the use of eminent domain would expand beyond slum removal.  If 
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blight, why not beauty? If beauty, why not bounty?”60  An unpleasant slide down 
that slope is what many would describe as occurring in the eminent domain 
cases that occurred after Berman.  The Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff 
(1984) case focused on the state’s plans to diversify land ownership.  When 
Hawaii was originally settled, land ownership was limited to the chiefs of each 
island.61  By the 1960s, land ownership had not diversified much.  At that time, 
the state and federal governments owned forty-nine percent of the land in the 
state, and forty-seven percent of the land in the state was owned by just seventy-
two landowners.62  The state embarked on a plan to diversify land ownership by 
requiring landowners under certain circumstances to sell land to those who had 
been leasing land if they wished to make the purchase.  Landowners balked, 
arguing that they would face large tax burdens due to the forced sales.  The state 
responded with the Land Reform Act of 1967, a plan to allow lessees to petition 
to have a residential property they were leasing “taken” by eminent domain and 
then sold to the lessee.  The Act stated that lessees living on residential tracts of 
land of five acres or more could request to purchase the parcel that they leased.  
If twenty-five or half of lessees, whichever was less, requested to purchase 
parcels, the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA) would consider condemning the 
property “…if HHA finds that these public purposes will be served.”63  The 
property owners and the lessees would negotiate the sales price and if they 
could not reach an agreement, a sales price would be determined through 
                                                 
60
 Main, “How Eminent Domain Ran Amok.” 
61
 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 Ibid. 
 19
arbitration.  The fact that the properties would be taken through eminent domain 
would lessen the tax burden for the land owners.  In 1978, talks between lessees 
and property owners broke down, and the property owners sued over the policy. 
The Court heard arguments in 1984 and sided with the Hawaii Housing 
Authority, finding that “there is no uncertain question of state law…the Act 
unambiguously provides that ‘the use of the power…to condemn…is for a public 
use and purpose.’”64  The Court relied heavily on the Berman v. Parker case in its 
decision, drawing once again on the argument that the power to use eminent 
domain for a public use was difficult to clearly define and that it was the 
legislature’s responsibility to define what public use means.65  The Hawaii 
Legislature found that the concentration of land ownership created an oligopoly 
and the Court acknowledged that “regulating oligopoly and the evils associated 
with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”66  The regulation of 
oligopolies made the taking a public use, not a taking of private property to confer 
to another private party.  The Court further argued that “the Hawaii Legislature 
enacted its Land Reform Act not to benefit a particular class of identifiable 
individuals, but to attack certain perceived evils of concentrated property 
ownership in Hawaii – a legitimate public purpose.”67 
   A landmark state case in Michigan bears a strong resemblance to the Kelo 
case.  The case of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit (1981) 
began in the late 1970s.  The City of Detroit and the State of Michigan were both 
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facing high unemployment:  14.2 percent in the state and 18 percent in Detroit.68  
The automobile industry had been Detroit’s lifeblood and it was failing miserably.  
The industry was struggling to build automobiles that could compete with foreign 
companies and needed a new assembly plant to do so.  General Motors was 
shutting down two assembly plants in Detroit and was willing to construct a new 
one if a suitable piece of land could be found.  Fearing 6,150 job losses if the 
plant was not built and wanting the $500 million plant to be built as well as the 
$15 million in tax revenue that it would create,69 the City helped to identify 
potential locations for the new plant based on General Motors’ specifications for 
a site “450 to 500 acres in size with access to long-haul railroad lines and a 
freeway system with railroad marshalling yards within the plant site.”70  General 
Motors also stipulated that the parcel must be available by May 1, 1981, in order 
to have the new plant built by 1983.  Only one of the nine locations that the City 
identified was found suitable:  the 465-acre site in the Poletown neighborhood.    
Unlike other eminent domain cases, the Poletown neighborhood did not 
involve cases of blight.  The City used the need to deal with high unemployment 
as the reason for the taking.  The Economic Development Corporations Act to 
states: 
There exists in this state the continuing need for programs to alleviate and 
prevent conditions of unemployment, and that it is accordingly necessary 
to assist and retain local industries and commercial enterprises to 
strengthen and revitalize the economy of this state and its municipalities.71 
                                                 
68
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (1981), 
648. 
69
 Cohen, “Eminent Domain After Kelo,” 514. 
70
 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (1981), 
653. 
71
 Ibid., 631. 
 21
If taking a neighborhood would help to reduce unemployment, the Act gave the 
municipalities the right to take it.  The City offered moving assistance, low-
interest (for the time) mortgages, and “hired a professional gerontologist to help 
assess the impact of the move on the elderly, who make up about half of those to 
be displaced.”72  The only reason the neighborhood was seized was because a 
major employer in the state promised to make better use of it.    
The case was heard by the Michigan Supreme Court in March of 1981.  At 
the heart of the case was the question of whether eminent domain was used for 
a public use or a private use.  The Poletown residents argued that General 
Motors would benefit the most from the taking, not the public.  The Court 
determined that the legislature had the authority to determine what constituted a 
public use and that the legislature had determined that this type of economic 
development “…meets a public need and serves an essential public purpose… 
The Court’s role after such a determination is made is limited.”73  That rationale is 
essentially the same as that applied by the United States Supreme Court in the 
Berman v. Parker case previously discussed.74   Interestingly, the Court then 
went on to state that although the legislature had determined that economic 
development was important and therefore, the use of eminent domain was 
allowed, the public benefit also needed to be evident: 
If the public benefit was not so clear and significant, we would hesitate to 
sanction approval of such a project…. Such public benefit cannot be 
speculative or marginal but must be clear and significant if it is to be within 
the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature.  We hold this project is 
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warranted on the basis that its significance for the people of Detroit and 
the state has been demonstrated.75 
The Poletown residents wanted the court “to distinguish between the terms 
‘use’ and ‘purpose’, asserting they are not synonymous and have been 
distinguished in the law of eminent domain.”76  The Court found that the terms 
public use and public purpose were indeed synonymous and that in previous 
cases, courts had found that “‘public use changes with changing conditions of 
society’ and that ‘the right of the public to receive and enjoy the benefit of the use 
determines whether the use is public or private.’”77  This request for distinct 
definitions of public use versus public purpose will be examined more in depth in 
later chapters of this thesis. 
The Poletown case in 1981 held until 2004 when the Michigan Supreme 
Court ruled on the case of County of Wayne v. Hathcock, another economic 
development case in Michigan.  Wayne County invested $2 billion to renovate 
the Metropolitan Airport, including the construction of a new runway.78  That new 
runway raised concerns over noise in the surrounding areas, so the county 
purchased, through voluntary sales, roughly 500 acres of land.79  The county 
then developed a plan to construct a 1,300-acre business park, hotel, and 
conference center near the airport.  The project was called the Pinnacle 
Project80, and the County added 500 additional acres to the original 500 
purchased.  It still needed 300 additional acres and opted to use eminent domain 
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to acquire much of that land.  By the time the lawsuit was filed, the County had 
acquired all but nineteen of the parcels needed for the project.81  Wayne County 
anticipated the project would produce 30,000 jobs and $350 million in tax 
revenue.82  The nineteen property owners filed suit, questioning the 
constitutionality of eminent domain for this purpose.  The Court of Appeals 
upheld the taking due to the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in the Poletown 
case, but acknowledged that the Poletown case might be decided differently 
today from how it had been decided in the 1980s.83  The Michigan Supreme 
Court heard the case to answer the questions of whether the county was 
authorized to use eminent domain, whether the economic development was 
indeed a “public purpose” based on the Poletown decision, and whether that 
decision complied with the state constitution.84   
The Michigan Supreme Court found that Wayne County was a “public 
corporation” based on the Michigan constitution and was authorized to use 
eminent domain based on Michigan statute MCL 213.23.85  That statute granted 
Wayne County, as a public corporation, the authority “to take private property 
necessary for a public improvement or for the purposes within the scope of its 
powers for the use or benefit of the public….”86  Since the county could use 
eminent domain, the next question the court had to answer was whether the 
county overstepped its bounds by using eminent domain for the purpose of 
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amassing property for the 1,300-acre Pinnacle Project.  The court ruled that 
taking in the Wayne case was unconstitutional based in part on the rationale of 
Justice Ryan, who drafted the dissenting opinion in the Poletown case.87  Justice 
Ryan outlined a litmus test of sorts to be applied if public agencies were to use 
eminent domain that involved transferring property to a private firm.  The test is 
based on the legal precedence prior to 1963, when Michigan’s current 
constitution was ratified.88  The test listed three questions and if the answer to 
any of the questions was affirmative, the taking could be considered a public 
use.89  The questions centered on three factors:  the need for the property, 
accountability for the use of the property and the public concern for properties 
that were in states of disrepair.90   
The first question of public necessity stemmed from Justice Ryan’s 
description of eminent domain over the course of history in Michigan.  He wrote 
that historical use “‘of eminent domain for private corporations has been limited 
to those enterprises generating public benefits whose very existence depends on 
the use of land that can be assembled only by the coordination central 
government alone is capable of achieving.’”91  This would include previous uses 
such as to amass land for railroad tracks or roadway projects.   The second 
question surrounded accountability:  if a private company would benefit from the 
taking, would there be “some measure of government control over the operation 
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of the enterprise after it has passed into private hands”92 to ensure that the public 
interest continued to be served?  Justice Ryan again relied on case law dating to 
the use of eminent domain for the construction of the national railroad system, 
noting that railroad companies were subject to regulations imposed by the federal 
government.93  He also argued that the “general public must have a right to a 
certain definite use of the private property, on terms and for charges fixed by law, 
and the owner of the property must be compelled by law to permit the general 
public to enjoy it.”94  The third question Justice Ryan outlined was whether there 
was a matter of public concern, such as blight, that would be addressed by the 
taking.95  Here he noted that if the “determination of the specific land to be 
condemned is made without reference to the private interests of the 
corporation,”96 the taking may be justified.   If the answer to any of those 
questions was in the affirmative, the court in the Wayne case could determine 
that there was a public use involved.  If not, the taking would not be considered 
justified.97  The Michigan Supreme Court found in the Wayne case that the 
county’s use of eminent domain to acquire property for the Pinnacle Project did 
not pass the litmus test outlined in Justice Ryan’s dissenting opinion.98  The 
project did not meet the criteria for a project that could be completed only with 
land that the government could amass.  The project did not include sufficient 
safeguard to ensure that the public maintained access or a say in how the 
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property would be used in the future, nor were there concerns over blight or other 
significant public interests in the properties that were being taken; therefore, the 
takings in this case were unconstitutional.99  The ruling in that case essentially 
reversed the Poletown case by placing limitations on how eminent domain cases 
could be handled.100  Those limitations were judicially imposed, though, not 
based on limitations set by the state legislature.   
The battle over eminent domain would reach a fevered pitch in 2005, when 
the United States Supreme Court again revisited the issue in the case of Kelo v. 
City of New London.  The case began in 2000 when the City of New London, 
Connecticut, sought to improve the local economy through a redevelopment plan.  
The city was struggling with the loss of a naval center in the Fort Trumbull area.  
Unemployment was high and the population in the community was dwindling.101  
The city hoped to revitalize the area with the construction of a new state park, a 
development deal with the pharmaceutical company Pfizer, and a redeveloped 
waterfront area that included a retail area and residential properties.102  The City 
of New London purchased most of the land needed for the project.  Nine property 
owners holding fifteen properties sued to fight the development deal, including 
Susette Kelo.103  Kelo and the other property owners argued that the use of 
eminent domain for the redevelopment project violated the Fifth Amendment.  A 
New London Superior Court ruled that the takings were justifiable and the case 
was appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court.  That court also ruled that the 
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takings were justified under state statute, which states “‘that the taking of land, 
even developed land, as part of an economic development project is a ‘public 
use’ and in the ‘public interest.’”104  The United States Supreme Court agreed to 
hear the case to weigh the question of whether “economic development satisfies 
the ‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”105 
The case was heard in February of 2005.  Justice Stevens wrote the opinion, 
which found that the City of New London’s use of eminent domain for economic 
development did not infringe on the Fifth Amendment based on previous case 
law, including Berman and Midkiff.  The City of New London’s “determination that 
the area was sufficiently distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation 
is entitled to (the Court’s) deference.”106  The court ruled that the use of 
economic development in this case is a public purpose because “promoting 
economic development is a traditional and long accepted function of 
government.”107  Citing the Berman and Midkiff cases, Justice Stevens 
acknowledged the public purposes in those cases, including blight in Berman and 
barriers to land ownership that resulted in an oligopoly in the Midkiff case:   
“Clearly, there is no basis for exempting economic development from our 
traditionally broad understanding of public purpose.”108  Again citing Midkiff, 
Justice Stevens also wrote that it is not for the court to decide if there is 
“reasonable certainty” that the economic benefits promised will actually be 
realized because “when the legislature’s purpose is legitimate and its means are 
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not irrational,” the courts should not delve into the issue of how certain the 
legislature is of the outcome.109 
When the Kelo case was being argued, attorneys for Susette Kelo and the 
other petitioners argued that the taking in the case essentially allowed seizing 
any property from one owner and transferring it to another “for the sole reason 
that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use and thus pay more 
taxes.”  The court refused to consider the hypothetical situation.  Justice Stevens 
wrote that: 
A one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an 
integrated development plan, is not presented in this case.  While such an 
unusual exercise of government power would certainly raise a suspicion 
that a private purpose was afoot, the hypothetical cases positioned by 
petitioners can be confronted if and when they arise.110 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Kelo case was one of 
the simplest rulings in eminent domain case law, but its implications have been 
far reaching.  It allows any state to adopt economic development as an 
acceptable reason to take private property, regardless of the condition of the 
current property, the current use of the property, or the future use of the property.  
It offers no protection for property owners that the property will not be turned over 
to another private landowner, and it does not provide any opportunity for the 
current property owner to benefit from the economic redevelopment by being part 
of it.   
The case also set the stage for a series of reforms meant to protect private 
property owners in a myriad of ways.  Those reforms have included legislative 
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restrictions on economic development as well as voter-approved ballot initiatives 
that restrict eminent domain.  Many of those efforts included limitations on 
government’s actions and expanded rights for property owners.  Many of those 
reforms have themselves complicated eminent domain.  Those reforms and their 
implications will be reviewed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
REACTION TO THE KELO DECISION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The majority of states have adopted some sort of reform in the four years 
since the Kelo v. City of New London (2005) decision.  The types of reforms vary 
from wholesale revisions of how eminent domain is used, especially in the areas 
of economic development and blight, to cosmetic reforms that may do little to 
change anything about the way eminent domain cases are handled.  This 
chapter will review what scholars suggest constitute positive and negative reform 
efforts, which types of reform various states have enacted, and will provide an in 
depth review of Nevada’s reform efforts.   
Ilya Somin and Andrew Morris both provide a scheme for sifting through the 
good and the bad eminent domain reform.   For Somin, effective responses to 
Kelo are those that strengthen protections from eminent domain in cases of 
economic development;111 conversely, ineffective reforms are those that are 
disguised as real reform but do little to protect from abuses in cases of blight.112  
She found that the majority of the newly enacted post-Kelo reform laws are likely 
to be ineffective.”113   Similarly, Andrew P. Morriss provides a scheme for 
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categorizing eminent domain reform.114  Like Somin, Morriss reviews many of the 
state responses to Kelo and categorizes them as substantive or symbolic reforms 
in the area of economic development.  For Morriss, substantive reforms are 
those that limit the use of eminent domain for economic redevelopment or blight; 
he also stipulates that the best reforms are those that guarantee the protections 
in the state constitution.115   
Both Somin and Morriss rely on a “50 State Report Card” issued by the Castle 
Coalition, 116 a project of the property rights advocacy group called the Institute 
for Justice, which bills itself as the “nation's only libertarian public interest law 
firm.”117  The report card grades each state’s response to Kelo in light of the 
types of reform enacted in the years since the Kelo decision.  This chapter will 
review the ways that Somin, Morriss, and the Castle Coalition define positive and 
negative reforms.  It will also examine which states received high marks for 
reforms and which states failed to enact adequate reform in light of Somin’s, 
Morriss’, and the Castle Coalition’s definitions of good and bad reform.  It will 
also provide an in-depth review of Nevada’s response to the Kelo decision.  In 
comparison with other states, Nevada scored fairly well for its efforts to protect 
property rights, including in the area of economic development.  Reform efforts 
have included a ballot initiative known as the People’s Initiative to Stop the 
Taking of Our Land (PISTOL), two bills that were approved in the state 
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legislature, and significant public debate about the types of reforms that were 
needed. 
Defining Eminent Domain Reform 
 
  
The Castle Coalition correctly argues that positive reform efforts should define 
what true public uses are, prohibit eminent domain for economic development, 
and narrow the definition of blight so that the designation cannot be used as a 
disguise for economic development takings.118   The report weighs the 
effectiveness of each state’s efforts on the basis of one question:  “How hard is it 
now for the government to take a person’s home or business and give it to 
someone else for private gain?”119  
The Coalition favors limiting eminent domain to traditional public uses such as 
roadways, government buildings, or schools, uses that put the government in 
control of the property, and favors a ban on any action that turns property seized 
through eminent domain over to a private owner.120  The Coalition also 
advocates having courts provide a check on the government’s ability to use 
eminent domain for public uses, suggesting that the government entity taking the 
property should have to prove to the court that the property will be put to a public 
use.121  Reform is especially needed, the group argues, in how governments 
define blight.  Historically blight was used to deal with truly dilapidated or 
abandoned properties but many governments now use blight designations as a 
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way “to circumvent the public use requirement” in eminent domain law.122  Its use 
“has become so expansive that tax-hungry governments now have the ability to 
take away perfectly fine middle- and working-class neighborhoods and give them 
to land-hungry private developers who promise increased tax revenue and 
jobs.”123 
Like the Castle Coalition, Ilya Somin advocates an outright ban of eminent 
domain to transfer ownership to private interests for the purpose of stimulating 
economic development.124   Her rationale is simple:  transferring property from a 
property owner that pays little or no taxes to one with a higher tax rate can be too 
enticing for some governments to pass up and there are no checks in place to 
ensure that abuse does not occur.  She writes, “while the economic development 
rationale may not be literally limitless, it is certainly close to it.”125  Another danger 
is that there is no requirement that the new property owners must live up to the 
economic claims made when the condemnation occurs and “the lack of a binding 
obligation creates incentives for public officials to rely on exaggerated claims of 
economic benefit that neither they nor the new owners have any obligation to live 
up to.”126  She also argues that blight designations are dangerous because they 
are ambiguous.  In the middle of the twentieth century, blight “fit the layperson’s 
intuitive notion of blight:  dilapidated, dangerous, or disease-ridden 
neighborhoods.”127  Today, that definition is not so clear and blight can mean 
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nearly anything that a government entity wants it to mean.128  The issue of blight 
is central to Somin’s judgment of what constitutes true economic domain reform 
post-Kelo.  She argues that state responses to Kelo fell into two categories:  
effective and ineffective reforms.  Effective reforms are those that limit a 
government’s ability to use eminent domain for economic development while 
ineffective reforms are those that claim to protect against the use of eminent 
domain for those purposes “but essentially allow them to continue under another 
name,” such as blight.129  Somin also argues that the effectiveness of the reform 
is dependent on how that reform was initiated; “citizen-initiated referendum 
initiatives have led to the passage of much stronger laws than those enacted 
through referenda initiated by state legislature.”130   
Of the forty-three states that approved some sort of reform, Somin 
categorizes 20 or 21 of the reforms as effective, 26 or 27 of the reforms as 
ineffective.131  Somin highlights strong public opinion poll results that show 
support for eminent domain reform, yet most of the reforms passed were 
classified by Somin as ineffective.  Her argument is that the public was fooled 
into thinking that legislatures were creating meaningful reform when in reality 
most of what was approved was ineffective.  She then makes a startling 
argument that judicial involvement is needed to fix the weak legislation that many 
states approved because the public is politically ignorant:         
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If public ignorance could prevent the political process from providing 
effective protection for individual rights in such a high-profile case, it might 
also fall short in other cases where rights supported by majority opinion 
are at stake.  Judicial review is not just a check on the tyranny of the 
majority.  Sometimes, it may also be needed to protect us against the 
consequences of the majority’s political ignorance.132 
Somin’s argument seems to disregard the fact that the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Kelo found that the responsibility for making eminent domain 
policy rests with the legislature, not with the judiciary.  Somin’s departure from 
Court’s recommendations in the Kelo case will be discussed at greater length in 
the next chapter of this thesis. 
Similarly, Andrew Morriss argues for limitations on eminent domain for 
economic development “to eliminate the abuse without preventing the relatively 
noncontroversial ‘good’ uses of eminent domain….” 133  Distilling a lengthier list of 
eminent domain reform criteria from other authors,134 Morriss defines substantive 
reform efforts as those that place “restrictions on the use of eminent domain for 
economic development, [place] restrictions on the use of blight designations as a 
justification for eminent domain, and [adopt] constitutional, rather than merely 
statutory, restrictions on eminent domain.”135  
States Respond to Kelo 
 
 
Like Somin and Morriss, the Castle Coalition report also graded eminent 
domain reform efforts on how well those efforts limited a state’s use of eminent 
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domain for economic development and blight.  According to the Coalition, twenty-
one states passed what the Castle Coalition calls meaningful reform, fifteen 
passed reforms that did not pass the Coalition’s muster, and a few states did not 
pass any reform measures at all.136  The Report Card provides a thumbnail 
overview of the reform, or lack thereof, adopted in each state.  The report 
examined the states’ reforms through the lens of a single question:  “How hard is 
it now for the government to take a person’s home or business and give it to 
someone else for private gain?”137  That statement is perhaps the simplest way 
to review the post- Kelo reform.  The Coalition’s Report Card gave four states A 
or A- grades for the reforms passed while fifteen states received a grade of D+, D 
or D- for reform efforts.  (Eight states failed to pass any sort of reform, marked 
with an F grade.)138  In this section, I will review some of the policies that scored 
high marks in the Coalition’s report, some of the policies that were approved but 
considered ineffective, and some of the policies that failed to pass.   
Of the states that achieved high marks from the Castle Coalition, those efforts 
approved in Florida and Michigan stood out as particularly effective because of 
their efforts to limit eminent domain for economic development and blight.  Those 
states enacted both legislative and constitutional reforms.  Florida’s efforts 
earned the state an A grade from the Coalition, which stated that “the Florida 
Legislature proved that it understood the public outcry caused by the Supreme 
Court’s abandonment of property rights.”139  Florida’s legislative efforts included 
                                                 
136
 Castle Coalition, 50 State Report Card.   
137
 Ibid., 3-4. 
138
 Ibid., Table of Contents and State Grades pages.  
139
 Ibid., 13. 
 37
the approval of House Bill 1567, which stripped the state’s ability to use eminent 
domain for blight removal and severely limited the state’s ability to turn land 
seized through eminent domain over to a private party.140   The bill requires that 
a government entity that takes private property through eminent domain hold on 
to the property for a period of at least ten years.141  Turning it over to a private 
entity is prohibited except in circumstances where the private party will use it for 
a roadway (including toll roads), public utility, or other type of public 
infrastructure.142  The bill also includes a caveat that allows the property to be 
sold to a private party within ten years if “the condemning authority or 
government entity holding title to the property documents that the property is no 
longer needed for the use or purpose for which it was acquired” and it gives the 
property owner at the time of the eminent domain action first right of refusal to 
purchase the property at the price he or she received for the taking.143  The 
legislation’s common-sense approach also allows the public entity building a 
facility to lease “an incidental part of a public property or a public facility for the 
purpose of providing goods or services to the public.”144  That provision allows an 
airport to lease a portion of a facility to an airline or to a restaurant to provide 
services within the facility.  The bill also allows for so-called friendly 
condemnation cases, in which a property owner allows his / her property to be 
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taken by eminent domain.145  The friendly condemnation provides tax benefits to 
the property owner that he or she would not enjoy if they simply sold the 
property. 
Somin, Morriss, and the Castle Coalition all emphasize the need to limit or 
prohibit the use of eminent domain for blight.  Florida House Bill 1567 specifically 
states that a government entity “may not exercise the power of eminent domain 
to take private property for the purpose of preventing or eliminating slum or blight 
conditions.”146  The state or other government entity can deal with slum, blight, or 
public nuisance issues through other powers, but not by using eminent 
domain.147  Florida further strengthened reform in 2006 with the legislature and 
Florida voters approved a constitutional amendment that requires a supermajority 
vote in both houses of the state legislature in order to grant any exceptions to the 
rules that prohibit the transfer of property taken via eminent domain to another 
private property owner.148  The amendment was approved by 69 percent of the 
voters.149  The Castle Coalition praised Florida’s efforts, saying that the state 
“has gone from being among the worst offenders to offering some of the best 
protection in the nation….”150  
Similarly, Michigan enacted legislation and constitutional reforms in the areas 
of blight and economic development, scoring an A- from the Castle Coalition 
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report.151  Eight legislative acts and a constitutional amendment were approved 
between 2005 and 2007.152  Michigan’s reform in the area of blight is found in 
Senate Joint Resolution E, approved by the Michigan Legislature in 2005 and 
overwhelmingly approved by voters in 2006.153  The resolution “changed the so-
called blight law within the state, requiring blight to be determined on a parcel by 
parcel basis.”154  It also clarifies that “public use does not include the taking of 
private property for transfer to a private entity for the purpose of economic 
development or enhancement of tax revenues.”155  (Two bills in the legislature 
also clarified this language.)156  Furthermore, it forces governments to pay a 
premium for property taken through eminent domain.  The amendment requires 
that governments pay at least 125 percent of “fair market value, in addition to any 
other reimbursement allowed by law” for residences that are taken.157  That 
provision can be seen as an insurance policy of sorts for residential property 
owners, with the premium price allowing property owners to be made whole, so 
to speak, for the taking.  A similar provision exists in Nevada’s reform efforts.  
Michigan’s legislative efforts included six other bills that dealt with various other 
eminent domain related issues, including allowing for the reimbursement of 
attorneys fees in some aspects of eminent domain cases and increasing the 
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allowable moving expenses for those displaced by eminent domain 
proceedings.158   
Again, the Castle Coalition’s test for good or bad reform rests on the answer 
to a single question, “how hard is it now for the government to take a person’s 
home or business and give it to someone else for private gain?”159  Most of the 
states that rated poorly in the Castle Coalition report did so because the reform 
efforts did little to change eminent domain law to make it more difficult for 
government to take private property from one owner and turn it over to another 
private party.  “True eminent domain reform,” the Castle Coalition argues, 
“should start with states narrowing their laws’ definitions of public use.”160  States 
that failed to do so, including Connecticut and California, received low marks for 
their reforms. 
Connecticut, “the state that gave us the Kelo case,”161 received a D rating on 
the Report Card.  Following the Kelo decision, Connecticut’s state legislature 
approved Senate Bill 167, a bill that updated, albeit ineffectively according to the 
Castle Coalition, the state’s eminent domain law.  The bill requires a two-thirds 
majority vote of the governing body taking the property, requires a public hearing 
when properties are to be taken,162 and “purports to stop condemnations 
‘primarily’ for increased tax revenues.”163  
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The Castle Coalition criticized Connecticut’s reform because it “offers no 
substantive property rights protections.…”164 The legislature’s reform states that 
“no real property may be acquired by eminent domain…for the primary purpose 
of increasing local tax revenue.”165  The Castle Coalition criticizes this thin 
version of reform, stating that the bill “offers no substantive property rights 
protections”166 because the state can still proceed with economic development 
projects if: the “cities are determined to see a project approved, they can easily 
assert an alternative ‘primary purpose.”  The bill does require a board attempting 
to take a property either to vote separately on each parcel to be taken or to list all 
properties that are to be taken by eminent domain prior to a vote.167  While the 
bill states that the board must ensure “that the current use of the real property 
cannot be feasibly integrated into the overall development plan,”168 it fails to 
define what “feasibly integrated” means.  Would a small boutique store still be 
taken if it didn’t fit into the plans for a new mega-mall filled with big-name 
retailers?  The failure to define what “feasibly integrated” means gives too much 
latitude to a state with a history of using eminent domain for economic 
development.  On a positive note, the bill does require that if the entity that took 
the property fails to use the property for a public use, it must offer to sell it back 
to the original owner or his / her heirs, that the property owner or the heirs have 
six months to make a decision on the purchase, and that the price tag for the 
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property be what the government entity paid for it or fair market value, whichever 
is less.169 
California also earned a miserable grade of D- for its reform.  The state 
legislature approved several bills in 2006, but a ballot question that would have 
enacted further reform failed.  According to the Castle Coalition, the bills 
“create[d] a few procedural hoops for condemning authorities to jump through,” 
but did little to truly reform eminent domain law.170  The bills included 
requirements for greater public disclosure of redevelopment plans, time limits for 
how long a government entity can hold on to a property seized by eminent 
domain without using it, and additional limitations on how government entities 
can grant themselves extensions for using property taken by eminent domain.  
Senate Bill 1809 requires that government entities adopting redevelopment plans 
file those plans with the county recorder within 60 days of adoption.  The bill also 
requires that those plans clearly state which properties are to be taken by 
eminent domain and that any redevelopment plans already approved must be 
amended with the properties that will be taken.171  Another bill enacted by the 
California Legislature, Senate Bill 1210, requires that government pay for an 
appraisal of the property owner’s choosing.172  Two bills deal with the time that a 
government has to use a property taken by eminent domain.  Senate Bill 1650 
requires that a government entity use a property taken within ten years but allows 
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government to grant itself an extension with a supermajority vote,173 while Senate 
Bill 1210 requires that government show that blight remains in a redevelopment 
in order to extend redevelopment plans past the original window.174  Blight was 
also the subject of Senate Bill 1206.   The problem with the law is that it does not 
limit the use of eminent domain for blight to properties that are blighted 
themselves; rather it defines blight in the following way: 
      A blighted area is one that contains both of the following: 
(1) An area that is predominantly urbanized… and is an area in which 
the combination of conditions… is so prevalent and so substantial that it 
causes a reduction of, or lack of, proper utilization of the area to such an 
extent that it constitutes a serious physical and economic burden on the 
community that cannot reasonably be expected to be reversed or 
alleviated by private enterprise or governmental action, or both, without 
redevelopment.175 
 
The second requirement for blight is that the area – not a specific property – 
meets the definition of blight.  California code defines blight in many of the 
traditional ways, with descriptions of parcels and the facilities on them as 
chronically dilapidated to the point that they create health or safety hazards, but 
also includes vague definitions as an area that “may also be characterized by the 
existence of inadequate public improvements or inadequate water or sewer 
utilities”176 and areas with too many liquor stores or high crime rates.  Since the 
law does not require a blight designation for specific properties, it is ripe for 
abuse.  Any property that happens to be a blighted area may be taken. 
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Efforts that would have helped California to fare better in the Castle Coaliton’s 
report failed.  A ballot initiative nearly identical to the one approved in Nevada 
failed in California.  (Nevada’s reform efforts, including the ballot initiative, will be 
discussed next in this chapter.)  California’s “The Protect Our Homes Act” 
(Proposition 90) included nine provisions that were also included in the original 
version of the Nevada ballot initiative.  The nine provisions included a prohibition 
of transferring property taken by eminent domain from one private owner to 
another, defining fair market value and damage to property, and requirements 
that property owners have access to appraisals that the government or its 
designee conducts on the property.  The initiative also sought to differentiate the 
terms “public use” and “public purpose,” a distinction that seems increasingly 
important as governments turn to redevelopment.  The ballot initiative failed 47.5 
percent to 52.5 percent.177  
Nevada’s Response to Kelo 
 
 
Nevada’s reaction to the Kelo decision was swift.  In 2005, attorney Kermitt 
Waters and former District Court Judge Don Chairez launched a ballot initiative 
to overhaul Nevada’s eminent domain law.178  The initiative was known as the 
People’s Initiative to Stop the Taking of Our Land (PISTOL) and it included a 
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“Property Owners Bill of Rights.”179  Waters is an outspoken attorney who has 
been involved in several eminent domain cases, while Chairez had ruled for 
property owners in a well-known eminent domain case in Nevada.  That case 
involved property owners whose property was taken via eminent domain for the 
construction of a parking garage at the Fremont Street Experience, a private 
venture that was part of the City of Las Vegas’ redevelopment plans.180  The 
original PISTOL initiative included three provisions that speak more generally to 
property rights:  one that states that “all property rights are hereby declared to be 
fundamental constitutional rights and each and every right provided herein shall 
be self executing.”181  Another provision defines government to include “any 
public or private entity that has the power of eminent domain,” and the final 
provision states that if any part of the initiative is removed, the remaining sections 
will stand.182  The bulk of the initiative, the remaining eleven provisions, seeks to 
protect property owners.  Those eleven provisions can be divided into four 
general categories of protections:  limitations on the notion of public use; further 
definitions of just compensation; strict requirements on the judicial branch’s 
involvement in eminent domain cases; and limitations on the amount of time a 
government has to use the land taken via eminent domain.   
On the subject of public use, the Property Owners Bill of Rights states that 
public use does not “include the direct or indirect transfer of any interest in 
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property taken in an eminent domain proceeding from one private party to 
another private party.”183  That would limit many of the economic development 
takings in cases such as Kelo and the redevelopment case that Judge Don 
Chairez decided.  The PISTOL initiative also declares that the “burden to prove a 
public use” rests with the government entity initiating the taking.184   
Six of the eleven provisions in the initiative deal in some way with the issue of 
just compensation, including defining just compensation “as that sum of money, 
necessary to place the property owner back in the same position, monetarily… 
as if the property had never been taken.”185  That includes expenses the property 
owner incurs due to the forced move.  A property must be “valued at its highest 
and best use,” and “in all eminent domain actions where fair market value is 
applied, it shall be defined as the highest price the property would bring on the 
open market.”186  To ensure that property owners are aware of the appraised 
value of the homes, the initiative allows them to hire their own appraisers to 
provide an estimated value and requires that the government turn over all 
appraisals on the property.  The remaining just compensation protections allow a 
property owner to sue for any government action that diminishes property value, 
such as zoning decisions, and protects the property owner from having to pay 
any legal fees to the government as a result of fighting the taking.187   
The third reform category dealt with the judicial branch’s involvement in 
eminent domain cases in Nevada.  One provision limited the judges that could 
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hear eminent domain cases to those who had been elected, while the second 
judicial provision gave property owners the opportunity to “preempt one judge at 
the district court level and one justice at each appellate court level.”188  The 
initiative also nullified any judicial opinion that was not issued in writing.189   The 
fifth categorical protection is in the area of timeliness of projects, requiring that 
the government use the land taken via eminent domain within five years or the 
property owner has the right to purchase the land at the price he / she sold it to 
the government.190 
Some of the provisions in the original version of PISTOL were not on the 
version that voters approved in 2006 and 2008.  A challenge filed by a number of 
government entities, the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, Associated General 
Contractors, Southern Nevada Homebuilders Association, and private individuals 
led to the Nevada Supreme Court’s removing several provisions from the original 
PISTOL initiative.  The court ruled that the initiative addressed multiple subjects, 
a violation of Nevada’s single-subject rule.  The rule, spelled out in Nevada 
Revised Statutes 295.009, requires that ballot initiatives be limited to a single 
subject.191  The court ruled that the single-subject rule did not violate the Nevada 
Constitution, nor did it limit free speech.192  Rather, it “facilitates the initiative 
process by preventing petition drafters from circulating confusing petitions that 
address multiple subjects.”193  The court removed five provisions that it said 
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violated the single-subject rule.  Those provisions included a section that states 
property rights are “fundamental constitutional rights.”194  The court ruled that 
“this section is about making all property rights fundamental rights, and thereby 
creating a broad new class of fundamental rights….it does not deal with the 
subject of eminent domain.”  Section eight, which states that property owners can 
be compensated for any zoning decision or requiring the move of a driveway, 
was also stricken.  The court found that the provision also violated the single-
subject rule because it dealt with zoning and a; number of other government 
actions, not just eminent domain.195  Sections three, nine and ten were also 
removed from the initiative before voters went to the polls.  Those provisions had 
to do with the judicial portion of the initiative.  Section three prohibited 
unpublished decisions in eminent domain cases, section nine limited which 
judges could hear eminent domain cases, and section ten gave property owners 
direct control over any hearing process by giving them the ability to reject one 
judge at the district court and at each appellate level.196  The court ruled that 
“these provisions concern the day-to-day operations of Nevada’s court system 
and therefore direct decisions that have been delegated to the judiciary… They 
do not propose policy but instead are distinctly administrative; consequently, they 
must be stricken.”197 
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The remaining nine sections stood in their original form and went before 
Nevada voters in November 2006.  Some members of Nevada’s construction 
industry, the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, and even some well-respected 
elected officials came out against the PISTOL initiative, even in its new form.  
Bruce Woodbury, a Clark County commissioner and chairman of the Regional 
Transportation Commission of Southern Nevada, argued that portions of the 
Property Owners Bill of Rights would still increase the cost of legitimate 
government uses for eminent domain, such as roadway projects, and that the 
requirement that government must use the property within five years was 
unrealistic due to the complexities of some large projects, such as the 215 
Beltway.198  Woodbury and others suggested that many property owners would 
argue for highest and best use prices based on the owner’s preferred zoning for 
his or her property, rather than on how the property was actually zoned.  Those 
increased costs could break the banks of governments already struggling to keep 
up with demands for goods and services.199  Despite those concerns, the PISTOL 
initiative was overwhelmingly approved statewide by Nevada voters with a vote 
of nearly two to one, or 63.11 percent in favor to 36.89 percent opposed.200  
Local results were similar in Clark County where the vote was 65.70 percent for 
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and 34.30 percent against.201  The initiative would need to be approved again by 
voters in 2008 in order to become law. 
Before the PISTOL question again went before voters, the Nevada 
Legislature, which had not met since the Kelo decision, also took up the subject 
of eminent domain in the 2007 session.  Assembly Bill 102, Senate Bill 85 and 
Assembly Joint Resolution 3 were heard during that session.  All three bills kept 
most of the PISTOL initiative protections intact while addressing the concerns 
that Commissioner Bruce Woodbury and others had with some of the provisions.  
The compromise bills clarified several provisions, including:  extending the time 
government had to use the property from five years to fifteen years; allowing  
property to be taken by eminent domain for redevelopment, but only if the land 
will be used for a public use such as an airport; it also allowed government to use 
eminent domain for a public use but also something as simple as a private 
concession (such as a coffee shop) in the new facility; and it required that a 
property be valued at its current use or the use that the government entity plans 
for the property, whichever is higher.202  Assemblyman Joe Hardy testified that 
“the goal is to have the agreement made between Commissioner Woodbury, 
Kermitt Waters, Don Chairez and many other players and partners” represented 
in those bills.203  He further stated that Assembly Bill 102 was intended to be 
effective upon passage, meaning that property owners did not have to wait for 
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PISTOL to be approved a second time to be afforded protection.  Assembly Joint 
Resolution 3, which was identical to Assembly Bill 102, was intended to be a 
long-term constitutional fix on the subject.  The resolution was approved, but 
would have to be approved by the legislature a second time (in 2009), approved 
by the governor and then put to a vote of the people in 2010 to be effective.204     
Voters approved PISTOL again in 2008, in the same version that they 
approved in 2006.  Support was slightly lower than the 2006 level, with 60.81 
percent of voters in favor of the reform and 39.19 percent against.  Now that 
PISTOL has been approved twice, it is now law and supersedes Assembly Bill 
102.  This version does not contain the legislative compromises achieved in 
2007.  The legislature approved that compromise bill, in the form of Assembly 
Joint Resolution 3, in 2009.  Voters will face this compromise version in the form 
of another ballot question in 2010.  If voters approve it, this revised version, what 
Assemblyman Joe Hardy called “PISTOL-plus,”205 will supersede PISTOL and 
the compromise version will become law. 
Ilya Somin and Andrew P. Morriss both argue for reforms that prohibit or 
severely limit the use of eminent domain for the purposes of blight and economic 
development.  Somin argues that effective reform efforts do not need to be an 
outright cure for all that ails eminent domain policy; reform that makes strides to 
improve the protections afforded to property owners makes the grade.206  
Nevada’s post-Kelo reform efforts, and the efforts in states such as Florida and 
Michigan, shows that reform is possible without the judicial interference that 
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Somin advocates.  The Kelo decision stated that the authority to limit eminent 
domain at the state level rests with the states themselves.  Nevada, Florida and 
Georgia have shown that reform efforts at the legislative and constitutional levels 
can be effective. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
REFINING EMINENT DOMAIN REFORM 
 
  
Introduction 
 
 
Chapters two and three of this thesis focused on the history of eminent 
domain and how states reacted when the United States Supreme Court gave 
them a great deal of leeway to determine how eminent domain can be used.  
States responded in several ways, some adopting major policy changes in how 
they handle eminent domain and some making no changes at all.207  In some 
cases, a desire to respond quickly to protect against a Kelo-like taking resulted in 
reform efforts that had unintended consequences of hampering government’s 
ability to do its job.  That was the case here in Nevada.  The early version of the 
PISTOL initiative discussed in chapter three contained tough reforms that would 
have hampered government’s ability to use eminent domain for legitimate public 
uses, not the “public purposes” vilified by so many.   
The varying nature of the states’ post-Kelo reforms reflects the imperfect 
nature of governance and varying views of individual property rights.  In this 
chapter, I will review the ethics of property rights based on the writings of John 
Dewey and John Locke and will provide suggestions for improving eminent 
domain policies to balance the rights of citizens with the responsibilities of 
government.  The ideal reform effort is similar to the eventual compromise bill 
approved here in Nevada.  It includes separately defining public uses from 
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“public purposes;” prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic 
development and blight as Somin, Morriss, and the Castle Coalition have 
recommended; and providing other tools that respect property rights and help 
states or municipalities deal with economically distressed properties.   
Ethics of Property Ownership 
 
 
     While eminent domain has a long history of use in the United States, property 
rights also have a strong history in America.  John Dewey and John Locke 
provide interesting points of view on government and the relationship with those 
it governs, on individuals and their relationship with society, and on property 
rights.  Both Dewey and Locke address the rights of the individual in context to 
society with differing results.208   
     Dewey’s writings are credited with shaping some of the United States 
Supreme Court cases in the early twentieth century that gave the legislative 
branch broad leeway in eminent domain cases, allowing for an increasingly wider 
view of public purpose.209  In describing the shifting views of eminent domain 
over time, both Ivers and Timothy Sandefur point to Dewey as an important 
reason for the broad leeway that the courts have given in eminent domain cases 
that involve “public purposes” and not just public uses.  In describing the impact 
of the Progressive Era on society, Sandefur notes that the individual was 
secondary to society and that John Dewey’s influence during that time is a large 
reason why.  He writes, “John Dewey, foremost champion of this concept, 
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denounced ‘the notion that there are two different “spheres” of action and of 
rightful claims; that of political society and that of the individual, and that in the 
interest of the latter the former must be as contracted as possible.’”210 That view, 
along with the notion that society, not the individual, is of utmost importance, is 
supported in David Fott’s book on John Dewey.   David Fott describes Dewey’s 
views of the individual in relation to society and how that view shifted over time.  
Fott writes that Dewey “refuses to consider the individual except in relation to 
society, and (usually) society except in terms of the individuals who constitute it.”  
Fott, referring to Dewey’s writings on education, quotes Dewey’s A Common 
Faith, written in 1897.  There Dewey writes that: 
Society is a society of individuals and the individual is always a social 
individual.  He has no existence by himself.  He lives in, for, and by 
society, just as society has no existence excepting in and through the 
individuals who constitute it.211 
Ivers writes that Dewey’s view was that “rights and privileges did not reveal 
themselves in natural or preordained fashion.  They were identified by the 
members of those societies with political power and protected by law.”212  
Through that lens, public purposes would be seen as acceptable reasons to take 
private property.  The good of the greater community would outweigh the specific 
right of the individual to protect what is his or hers.   
Dewey’s views, Fott writes, are distinctly different from those of John Locke’s 
view of the individual: 
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Locke begins with individual freedom and derives the qualified unity of civil 
society from that freedom; Dewey wants to respect individual rights but 
also to understand them in a social context of complete unity or 
integration….213   
 
 Locke’s views on property rights are found in his Second Treatise of 
Government.  In chapter five, titled On Property, Locke defines the nature of 
property and man’s relationship to it.214  He begins with the idea that the land, 
and the fruits of it, are given to man to use for sustenance.215  Gathering or 
growing food or killing animals for food makes those fruits of the land the 
property of the man who exerted that effort.  The land where those items grew 
can, too, become man’s property in the following way: 
…subduing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion, we see are 
joined together.  The one gave title to the other.  So that God, by 
commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to appropriate: and the 
condition of human life, which requires labour and materials to work on, 
necessarily introduces private possessions.216 
Locke further states that ownership has a limit.  Man can claim ownership of the 
land as long as he is not taking from another who has already made use of the 
land and as long as there is still land available for others to cultivate.217  
Additionally, Locke warns against wanting land that belongs to someone else 
when there was still land available for use.  He reiterates that land that belongs to 
one man should not be taken by another simply because he wants it.  God 
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provided land for “the use of the industrious and rational, (and labour was to be 
his title to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and 
contentious.”218   
Dewey’s and Locke’s views of the individual and their relationship to property 
and other individuals offer differing schools of thought on property rights and 
eminent domain.  In many eminent domain cases such as Poletown and the Kelo 
case itself, specific parcels of land were sought because of a prime location, and 
government thought that the would-be landowners would be more profitable than 
the previous land owners.  In Locke’s view of property, those types of takings 
should never be made.  The mere fact that another private individual wants the 
land is not sufficient reason for taking it. 
Defining How Eminent Domain Should Be Used 
 
 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in the Kelo case gives deference to the 
legislature to define the purposes under which eminent domain can be used, 
one’s views of property rights will have an impact on the type of eminent domain 
reform needed, or whether any is needed at all.  There are those, like the 
legislators who want broad-based power to use eminent domain for economic 
development and blight, who must believe that those uses are acceptable.  I side 
with Locke in the area of property rights, focusing on the individual’s right to 
protect what is his or hers and limiting society’s ability to infringe on those rights.  
Given that the court has granted legislatures broad latitude to use eminent 
                                                 
218
 Ibid., 21-22. 
 58
domain as they see fit, reform must begin with legislatures policing themselves 
as to how they use the power they have been granted. 
The homeowners in the Poletown case asked the Michigan Supreme Court to 
differentiate between the terms public use and public purpose and the court 
declined to separate them, “persuaded (that) the terms have been used 
interchangeably in Michigan…”219  Likewise, the United States Supreme Court 
said that the terms could be used interchangeably,220 but as the previous 
chapters have shown, there is a difference between a true public use and a more 
nebulous public purpose.  True public uses, for constructing roads, schools and 
public utilities, are not the issue since “few contest the power of government to 
condemn or assume the physical control of private property under the takings 
clause” for those types of uses.221  Public roads benefit all who move throughout 
a community.  Public schools, available to all children in a community, educate 
future generations, and education is generally recognized as a responsibility of 
government.  Public utilities, even those privately owned but franchised to 
provide key services such as providing water, electricity or natural gas, are 
generally recognized as important community services controlled by the 
government.   
The issue that generates the concern is when government also uses eminent 
domain for public purposes such as economic development.  With public purpose 
cases, the benefit to the community may be difficult to see (especially from the 
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point of view of the property owner whose land is being taken) or may not 
materialize at all.  Economic development serves a broad public purpose:  it can 
spur job growth, provide additional tax revenues and reduce or eliminate 
“blighted” conditions, but those ancillary benefits come at the expense of the 
rights of private property owners.  But as Ilya Somin discussed, economic 
development plans are just that – plans.  They do not require that the 
government or a private entity live up to the promises made or the jobs 
forecasted.222  The newly created shopping center or manufacturing plant rests in 
the hands of private landowners who can do with it what they please.  Unlike a 
school, roadway or airport, there are not always tangible or achievable public 
benefits to an economic development plan.  Shopping centers can fail, factories 
can go out of business (or in the case of General Motors, continue to struggle for 
decades after the Poletown case), and private property owners have been 
stripped of their property and the community no more enriched for it.  Somin also 
notes that it is not good enough to require companies to live up to the job 
creation numbers they forecast.  She notes that doing so can cause further 
economic decline if those numbers do not make good financial sense.  This 
reason “provides a strong argument against permitting economic development 
takings in the first place.”223  For that reason, economic development should not 
be considered a public use and eminent domain should not be used for public 
purposes. 
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Similarly, blight is often used as a rationale for eminent domain takings.  
Communities certainly have a vested interest in dealing with blight, but eminent 
domain does not have to the tool used to deal with it.  As Somin noted, blight 
used to be defined as extreme neglect that resulted in a property becoming a 
danger to the community, but the term is often used today to describe simple 
disrepair or an aging property.224  Unsafe buildings and unsanitary conditions 
create dangerous situations, but eminent domain need not be the tool used to 
deal with those types of properties.  Lumping law-abiding property owners in with 
property owners who are violating the law is government simply declaring guilt by 
association.  That is what occurred in the Berman v. Parker case when the 
owners of the department store were simply guilty of operating a business in a 
neighborhood that included many blighted properties and forced to give up their 
properties as a result.225  
     Ideal Reform Efforts Defined 
 
 
While governance is never perfect, it is possible to strike the right balance of 
property rights protection and government’s ability to carry out its responsibilities.  
If legislatures do police their use of eminent domain, what would that type of 
policy look like?  Economic development can still be achieved, blight can still be 
dealt with, and renewal of neighborhoods is possible.  The following section 
outlines what that ideal reform looks like.  The outline I present for ideal reform is 
based on a combination of the recommendations Somin and Morriss make for 
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prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic development and blight, as 
well as a review of the best of Nevada’s compromise bill, Assembly Bill 102.     
Governments that want to encourage redevelopment in a particular 
neighborhood can offer tax incentives to willing sellers and willing buyers as part 
of a redevelopment plan.  In some states, property owners willing to sell their 
parcels within an economically depressed area can do so through “friendly 
condemnation” type policies.  Typically, these plans allow property owners to sell 
parcels to the government entity and to receive tax benefits for doing so.  This 
transaction should be voluntary, not an eminent domain taking.  If a government 
declares a specific area ripe for redevelopment, a property owner can receive tax 
breaks for selling property within that zone.  Governments can and often do offer 
tax benefits to companies that purchase land and build in areas where 
government is encouraging redevelopment.  Businesses amass the parcels they 
want but receive tax incentives from government to entice them to invest in these 
areas.  These incentives typically last for a predetermined amount of time, 
eventually yielding to a normal tax structure once the area has rebounded or 
within a specified period of time.   
In cases of blight, government has many tools available to deal with truly 
blighted properties – those that meet the traditional idea of blight as Somin 
described – without resorting to taking land from law-abiding property owners 
and selling it to someone else.  Communities can deal with true cases of blight 
through health and building codes with escalating penalties for violating those 
codes.  Escalating penalties, to the point of a government’s taking over a 
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property because it is unsafe, can deal with individual properties that are blighted 
without impacting property owners who happen to have a home or business that 
is located near a blighted property.  A blight designation should never be applied 
to any property that merely happens to be located in an economically depressed 
area.  The law does not allow guilt by association in criminal cases, nor should it 
do so in the area of property rights. 
These methods are certainly not as easy as eminent domain.  Property 
owners can refuse to sell, but they have a right to do so in cases where there are 
attempts to take land for something other than a true public use.  Public purposes 
have value, but they ought not to trump a property owner’s rights to continue to 
lawfully use his or her property.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision affirms 
government’s power to do just that, it is incumbent upon legislatures to limit 
themselves.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Kelo Postscript 
 
 
The latest turn of events in the Kelo case illustrates why scholars such as Ilya 
Somin advocate banning the use of eminent domain for economic development.   
In November 2009, Pfizer announced that it was moving from the plant that was 
at the heart of the Kelo case.  Pfizer will move 1,400 jobs from New London to 
another Connecticut town.226  The move will “leave behind the city’s biggest 
office complex and an adjacent swath of barren land that was cleared of dozens 
of homes to make room for a hotel, stores and condominiums that were never 
built.”227  The location where Susette Kelo and the other petitioners in the Kelo 
case once lived is now reportedly a debris-filled lot.228  The Associated Press 
reports that the permit granting a developer the right to develop the land has 
lapsed.229  The reason for the move is not clear, though Pfizer recently merged 
with pharmaceutical company Wyeth and a company spokesperson has been 
quoted as saying “’We had a lot of real estate that we had to make strategic 
decisions about.’”230  The recession may also have played a role.  Irrespective of 
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the reason, the move devastates the redevelopment plans and means that the 
homes taken as part of the redevelopment effort were taken in vain. 
Pfizer’s move and the fact that the economic development plan has failed to 
materialize a decade after it began support Ilya Somin’s arguments that 
economic development plans are too uncertain to allow eminent domain to be 
used for such a purpose.  As Somin stated, economic development plans do not 
always materialize and remove too much of the control from government and the 
public and place too much faith in commercial enterprise. 231  The use of eminent 
domain for public uses such as schools and infrastructure projects allows the 
government to retain at least some measure of control over the property and, in 
the case of public facilities, retains some public access to the land.  That is not 
the case with public purposes such as economic development.  Control or public 
access are important in cases where a citizen’s property rights are being 
compromised to benefit a community.  If there is no clear public control or public 
access, the property rights of private citizens should not be compromised.   
Nevada’s eminent domain compromise bill232 comes very close to striking the 
right balance and provides a good starting point for outlining the best type of 
eminent domain policy.   The bill, drafted in the state legislature with the 
involvement of the backers of the PISTOL initiative, was a better result than the 
PISTOL initiative itself.  The bill deftly balances the needs of government and the 
public.  It allows the use of eminent domain for public uses such as roads, 
schools, or other true public facilities.  The bill also prohibits the use of eminent 
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domain for economic development that involves purely private uses but allows 
economic development that involves a public use, such as an airport.233  I 
support that distinction since the ultimate use is a public one, not one that turns 
the property over to a private developer and takes the future of the property out 
of the hands of the public.  Likewise, it allows for private sector involvement 
where appropriate (such as leasing ticketing gates at an airport to airlines so that 
the airport can function).  The bill still allows eminent domain to be used for 
blight, which I disagree with, but does afford some protection that the property 
owner must have an opportunity to buy back the property, safeguarding property 
owners’ rights.  The bill also puts a reasonable time limit on government to make 
use of the property.  Government entities may have to spend years acquiring 
property for major projects such as a freeway or an airport, and the Nevada bill 
gives government fifteen years to do that.234 
Put simply, the power of “eminent domain can be used to distribute and 
redistribute material benefits.”235  As Somin, Morriss, and the Castle Coalition 
argued, if government has the ability to decide to take land, even for a price, no 
property is safe.  Any homeowner or business owner is at risk.  As Main wrote, 
the slippery slope of eminent domain is dangerous.  It allows states to quickly 
move from using eminent domain for blight to using it for any reason it decides is 
legitimate.  Referring to Justice Douglas’s opinion in the Berman case that 
limiting the use of eminent domain was difficult to do, she writes that “it seemed 
only a matter of time until the criteria for the use of eminent domain would 
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expand beyond slum removal. If blight, why not beauty? If beauty, why not 
bounty?”236   
As Errol Meidinger noted, the uses of eminent domain have evolved with 
changes in the American economy.237  In the cases of Mill Acts, private property 
was taken to construct mills that were sometimes, though not always, open to the 
public.238  In the nineteenth century, eminent domain was used to expand the 
railroad across America.239  That does not differ much from the use of eminent 
domain for economic development today.  With some American cities struggling 
with economically depressed neighborhoods, high unemployment, and declining 
tax revenues, eminent domain was one of the tools used in the twentieth century 
to redevelop and revitalize cities.  The court gave legislatures a broad brush to 
use in eminent domain cases. 
That broad power also allows legislatures to limit themselves.  The United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling is consistent with the United States’ federalist 
system of governance.  States have power to determine how property is used 
and when that property can be taken.  As the Castle Coalition stated in its report, 
“states are free to enact legislation that restricts the power of eminent domain.”240  
The fact that the legislature has that power does not mean that it need be 
abused.  Legislatures can limit how eminent domain is used and still achieve the 
objectives government has to protect its people.   
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Nevada’s reform efforts illustrate the strength of the United States system of 
government and the checks and balances in that system.  The Court 
acknowledged that the legislature has the responsibility to decide under which 
circumstances eminent domain can be used.  Citizens were involved through the 
initiative process, approving a ballot measure to reform eminent domain.  The 
state legislature stepped in to adjust some of the provisions that went too far in 
hampering government’s ability to use eminent domain for legitimate public uses 
and the result is a balanced, though imperfect, eminent domain policy.  As 
Nevada has shown, those reform efforts can be accomplished.  Other states 
should follow suit. 
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